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Abstract
The conditions that can lead to the exploitative depletion of a shared resource, i.e, the tragedy
of the commons, can be reformulated as a game of prisoner’s dilemma: while preserving the common
resource is in the best interest of the group, over-consumption is in the interest of each particular
individual at any given point in time. One way to try and prevent the tragedy of the commons
is through infliction of punishment for over-consumption and/or encouraging under-consumption,
thus selecting against over-consumers. Here, the effectiveness of various punishment functions in an
evolving consumer-resource system is evaluated within a framework of a parametrically heterogeneous
system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs). Conditions leading to the possibility of sustainable
coexistence with the common resource for a subset of cases are identified analytically using adaptive
dynamics; the effects of punishment on heterogeneous populations with different initial composition
are evaluated using the Reduction theorem for replicator equations. Obtained results suggest that
one cannot prevent the tragedy of the commons through rewarding of under-consumers alone - there
must also be an implementation of some degree of punishment that increases in a non-linear fashion
with respect to over-consumption and which may vary depending on the initial distribution of clones
in the population.
Keywords: tragedy of the commons, mathematical model, Reduction theorem, adaptive dynam-
ics
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Introduction
Ecological and social systems are complex and adaptive, composed of diverse agents that are intercon-
nected and interdependent [12, 15, 16]. Heterogeneity within these systems often drives the evolution
and adaptability of the system components enabling them to withstand and recover from environmental
perturbations. However, it is also heterogeneity that makes the appearance and short-term prosper-
ity of over-consumers possible, which in turn can eventually lead to exhaustion of the common resources
(tragedy of the commons [4]) and consequent collapse of the entire population, also known as evolutionary
suicide [6]).
Elinor Ostrom has focused on the question of avoiding the tragedy of the commons from the point of
view of collective decision making in small fisheries [14]. She observed that the mutually satisfactory and
functioning institution of collective action could be developed in small communities where the possible
resource over-consumption by each individual was immediately noticeable and punished, such as in water-
monitoring systems instituted in Spanish huertas, where each user was able to closely watch the other,
and where punishment for stealing scarce water was instituted not only in monetary fines but also
in public humiliation. This illustrates a first path to prevent the tragedy of the commons: infliction of
punishment/tax for over-consumption, effectively selecting against over-consumers. For instance, Ostrom
cites as an example of a successful adaptive governance system rural villages in Japan, where about
3 million hectares of forests and mountain meadows were successfully managed even until now in no
small part because “accounts were kept about who contributed to what to make sure no household
evaded its responsibilities unnoticed. Only illness, family tragedy, or the absence of able-bodied adults
... were recognized as excuses for getting out of collective labor... But if there was no acceptable excuse,
punishment was in order” . Another situation, when the tragedy was successfully avoided, is when the
community introduces some kind of “social currency”, where an individual is rewarded for cooperation
with social status [11, 18]. This is an example of a second approach to preventing the tragedy of the
commons: bestowing reward/subsidy to under-consumers.
The dynamics of trade-offs between personal and population good have been studied through classical
game theory [13, 17, 5]. However, many of the potentially relevant results have been obtained for largely
homogeneous populations of players. In this paper we approach the question of preventing the tragedy
of the commons through instituting punishment/reward systems in heterogeneous populations using two
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recently developed methods for studying evolving heterogeneous populations in equation-based models,
namely adaptive dynamics [1] and the Reduction theorem for replicator equations [7, 8].
This paper is organized as follows: first we give a derivation of a previously studied model, modified to
incorporate the effects of a punishment/reward system on overall population survival. Next, we describe
different approaches for studying the effects of punishment and reward on population composition, namely,
adaptive dynamics and the Reduction theorem for replicator equations. Then we apply the two techniques
to a variety of punishment/reward structures, obtaining both analytical and numerical results for sample
populations that differ in their initial composition with respect to over- and under- consumers. We end
the paper with a reformulation of the obtained results in the context of the prisoner’s dilemma, as well
as with a comparison of the two modeling methods.
Model Description
In order to answer the questions posed in the introduction, we first turn to a modified version of a math-
ematical model of ‘niche construction’ proposed by Krakauer et al.[10], where a population of consumers
x(t) interact with a collectively constructed ‘niche’, represented as a common dynamical carrying capacity
z(t). Rather than restricting the model to a specific physical resource, we take the ‘niche’ to be a gener-
alized abstract ‘resource’, such as available nutrients, energy and other characteristics of the environment
that may affect both the individuals’ survival and fecundity (in case of financial systems, the ’resource’
could be an inter-convertible unit such as money) that each individual can invest or subtract from the
‘common good’. Different individuals can contribute to the common dynamical carrying capacity, or they
can subtract from it at different rates. Since sufficient reduction of the common ‘carrying capacity’ can
indeed lead to population collapse, this model allows to model effectively in a conceptual framework the
question of the effects of over-consumption on the survival of the population,
Within the frameworks of the model, each individual is characterized by his or her own intrinsic value
of resource consumption, denoted by parameter c; a set of consumers that are characterized by the same
value of c is referred to as c-clone. The total population of all consumers is N(t) =
∑
A xc if c takes on
discrete values and N(t) =
´
A xcdc if c is continuous, where A denotes the range of possible values of
parameter c.
The individuals xc(t) grow according to a logistic growth function, where the carrying capacity is not
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constant but is a dynamic variable. Each individual invests in resource restoration at a rate proportional
to (1 − c); an individual is considered to be an over-consumer if c > 1. Moreover, each individual is
punished or rewarded according to a general continuous function f(c) ∈ C1(Ru) that directly affects the
fitness of each consumer-producer such that each clone is immediately punished for over-consumption if
c > 1 or rewarded for under-consumption when c < 1.
The dynamics of the resource is determined by a natural restoration rate γ and decay/loss rate δz(t).
Restoration process is accounted for by the term e(1−c) N/z1+N/z , where z(t) is restored both proportionally
to each individual’s investment, accounted for by parameter c, and to the total amount of ’resource’
consumed by the entire population, represented by N(t)/z(t).
This yields the following system of equations:
x′c︸︷︷︸
clones
(t) = rxc(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
intrinsic growth
 c︸︷︷︸
consumption
− N(t)
kz(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
dynamical carrying capacity
+ xc(t)f(c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
punishment/reward
, (1)
z′(t)︸︷︷︸
resource
= γ︸︷︷︸
restoration
+ e
∑
A xc(t)(1− c)
z(t) +N(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in resource caused by consumers
− δz(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
decay/inflation
. (2)
The meaning of all the variables and parameters summarized in Table 1.
Meaning Range
z(t) abstract generalized ‘resource’ z ≥ 0
c rate of resource consumption c ∈ [c0, cf ]
xc(t) population of individuals competing for the resource xc ≥ 0
N(t) total population size N(t) =
´
A xc(t)dc N(t) ≥ 0
r individual proliferation rate r ≥ 0
k ‘resource’ conversion factor k ≥ 0
e efficiency of construction of common ‘niche’ e ≥ 0
γ intrinsic rate of ‘resource’ restoration independent of xc γ ≥ 0
δ per capita rate of natural ‘resource’ decay δ ≥ 0
c0 lower boundary value of parameter c c0 ≥ 0
cf upper boundary value of parameter c cf ≥ 0
Table 1: Summary of variables and parameters used in System 1.
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γ d e r k N0 z0 µ c0 cf
set 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.6 0.1 10 0 2.5
set 2 7.72 22 1 1 1 0.6 0.1 10 0 9.12
Table 2: Sample parameter values.
The case, where f(c) = 0 was previously completely studied in [9], both for the case of a para-
metrically homogeneous and parametrically heterogeneous system with respect to parameter c. Several
transitional regimes were identified with increasing parameter c, ranging from sustainable coexistence
with the common resource with ever decreasing domain of attraction to sustained oscillatory regimes to
collapse due to exhaustion of the common resource. The results are summarized in Figure 1. In Domain
1, when the parameter of resource consumption is small, the common carrying capacity remains large,
successfully supporting the entire population, since no individual is taking more resource than they re-
store. In Domain 2, a parabolic sector appears near the origin, decreasing the domain of attraction of the
non-trivial equilibrium point A. The population can still sustainably coexist with the resource even with
moderate levels of over-consumption but the range of initial conditions, where it is possible, decreases.
As the value of c is further increased, the range of possible parameter values that allow sustainable co-
existence with the common resource decreases and is now bounded by the unstable limit cycle, which
appears around point A through a catastrophic Hopf bifurcation in Domain 3, and via generalized Hopf
bifurcation in Domain 6. Finally, in Domain 4 and 5, population extinction is inevitable due to extremely
high over-consumption rates unsupportable by the resource.
In this paper we will investigate the question of whether timely infliction of punishment for over-
consumption or rewarding under-consumption can prevent such a collapse and consequently prevent the
tragedy of the commons. We will also investigate the degree of effectiveness of punishment depending on
initial composition of the population with respect to parameter c. Finally, we will try to investigate the
question of whether punishing those who over-consume or rewarding those who under-consume will yield
better results. These questions will be addressed using two recently developed methods for modeling
parametrically heterogeneous populations, namely, adaptive dynamics [1] and Reduction theorem for
replicator equations [7, 8].
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Figure 1: Bifurcation diagram of System (1) when f(c) = 0 in the (γ, c) and (N,z) phase spaces for
fixed positive parameters e and δ. The non-trivial equilibrium point A is globally stable in Domain 1; it
shares basins of attraction with equilibrium O in Domains 2 and 3. The separatrix of O and the unstable
limit cycle that contains point A, serve, correspondingly, as the boundaries of the basins of attraction.
Only equilibrium O is globally stable in Domains 4, which also contains also unstable non-trivial A,
and 5, which contains the elliptic sector. Domain 6 exists only for δ > 5 +
√
24, where the stable limit
cycle that is in turn contained inside an unstable limit cycle, shares basins of attraction with equilibrium
O. Boundaries between Domains K,S,H,Nul, C correspond respectively to appearance of an attractive
sector in a neighborhood of O, appearance of unstable limit cycle containing A, change of stability of
equilibrium A via Hopf bifurcations, disappearance of positive A and saddle-node bifurcation of limit
cycles.
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Adaptive dynamics
Adaptive dynamics is a series of techniques that have been recently developed to address questions of
system invasibility by rare ‘mutant’ clones. The main focus of this method is in evaluating a “mutant’s”
ability to proliferate in an environment set by the ‘resident’ population [1]. We use this method to evaluate
different punishment/reward functions and their efficiency in preventing the tragedy of the commons. It is
worth noting that a more general theory of systems with inheritance, which allows studying the problem of
‘external stability’ of a population of ‘residents’ to invasion by a ‘mutant’ population, has been developed
in [2]; it was later published in English in [3].
Consider the equation for the dynamics of a rare mutant xm in an environment set by the resident
xres. The total population size is xm + xres ≈ xres, since xm is assumed to be present at such low
frequency that its contribution to the size of the entire population is negligible.
Let x∗res satisfy
dxres
dt = 0 , which implies that x
∗
res =
kz
r (f(cres) + rcres). Now introduce a mutant,
such that
dxm
dt
= rxm(cm − xm + xres
kz(t)
) + xmf(cm). (3)
When the two subpopulations interact, the outcome of their interaction is determined by the sign of
the dominant eigenvalue of System
dxres
dt
= rxres(cres − xm + xres
kz(t)
) + xresf(cres),
dxm
dt
= rxm(cm − xm + xres
kz(t)
) + xmf(cm)
dz
dt
= γ + e
xres(1− cres) + xm(1− cm)
z + xm + xres
− δz
(4)
The stability of the single positive non-trivial equilibrium point (x∗r , x∗m, z∗) under the assumption
that the mutant is rare, i.e., when x∗m ≈ 0, is determined by the dominant eigenvalue of System (4),
which is given by λ = r(cm − cres) − f(cres) + f(cm): the mutant will be able to invade if λ > 0 and it
will not succeed if λ < 0. Invasion fitness of the mutant, i.e., the expected growth rate of a mutant in an
environment set by the resident, is given by
lim
T→∞
1
T
ˆ T
0
[
r(cm − xres(t)
kz(t)
) + f(cm)
]
dt = r(cm − 1
k
(
xres
z
)) + f(cm) = r(cm, Eres), (5)
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where (xresz ) = limT→∞
1
T
´ T
0
xres(t)
kz(t) dt. The selection gradient, which is defined as the slope of invasioga-
men fitness, determines if the invasion will be successful (positive sign of the selection gradient predicts
successful invasion) and is then given by
D(cm) =
∂
∂cm
r(cm, Eres)|[cm=cres] = r + f ′(cm). (6)
These conditions allow answering a question of “long-term” invasibility, i.e., whether a mutant with a
slightly difference value of cm will be able to permanently invade the population of individuals, character-
ized by parameter cres. The points where selection gradient is zero are known as evolutionarily singular
strategies (ESS) and are denoted here as c∗res. Stability of c∗res for different types of punishment/reward
functions is discussed below; summary of some of the possible types of c∗res is given in Table 3.
Adaptive dynamics Reduction theorem
Goal Model evolution of parametrically heterogeneous populations
Assumptions Clonal reproduction
Separation of evolutionary and ecological time scales
Environment Can be variable and affected by changes in population composition (also known as
seascape, or a dancing landscape)
Population Two types: invader and resident Any number of types
Small initial frequency of the invader Initial population composition can be
arbitrary
Can introduce new “mutants” All types must initially be present in the
population, even if at a near-zero
frequency
Requires “Lotka-Volterra” type growth rates (x′ = xF (t))
Purpose/
question
Invasion: can a mutant invade the
resident population?
Evolution of a parametrically
heterogeneous system over time due to
natural selection
Uses both theoretical analysis (bifurcation theory) and numerical solutions
Visual
representation
Pairwise invasibility plot (PIP) Bifurcation diagram of the corresponding
parametrically homogeneous system
Table 3: A comparison of adaptive dynamics and the Reduction theorem
Different types of punishment/reward functions
Case 1. Moderate punishment
Consider the case, when the punishment function is of the form f(c) = a 1−c1+c . This functional form allows
to incorporate moderate levels of punishment/reward, the severity of which is determined by the value
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of the parameter a.
The pairwise invasibility plot (PIP), which allows to visualize under what relative values of cm and
cres the dominant eigenvalue λ changes its sign, can be seen on Figure 2b,c, for a = 1 and a = 4. Blue
regions correspond to the case when λ(cres, cm) < 0, and consequently the mutant cannot invade; red
regions correspond to the case when λ(cres, cm) > 0, and the mutant can invade. The point of intersection
of the two curves corresponds to a convergence stable (CSS) but evolutionarily unstable strategy, which
can be invaded by “mutants” with large enough values of cm.
The selection gradient for this punishment function, D(cm) = r− 2a(1+cm)2 , so the mutant with cm ≈ cr
can invade when a < r2 (1 + cm)
2 (see Figure 2 a).
Figure 2: Selection gradient and pairwise invasibility plots (PIPs) for function of the type f(c) = a 1−c1+c .
Blue regions correspond to parameter values where the mutant cannot invade; red regions correspond to
parameter values where it can invade. (a) selection gradient, defined in Equation (6) (b) PIP for a = 1;
the singular strategy c∗res is evolutionarily unstable and convergence stable (c) PIP for a = 4; the singular
strategy c∗res is evolutionarily unstable and convergence stable. This punishment/reward function is not
effective against aggressive over-consumers.
These results suggest that modest punishment can therefore protect only from modest over-consumers.
However, more aggressive over-consumers cannot be kept of out the population, as the punishment is not
severe enough.
Case 2. Severe punishment/generous reward
Now consider a case, when the punishment function is of the form f(c) = a(1 − c)3, which allows to
impose much more severe punishment on over-consumers and more generous reward on under-consumers
compared to the previous case.
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The PIP for this functional form can be seen on Figure 3 for a = 0.1 and a = 0.6. Once again, blue
regions correspond to the case when λ(cres, cm) < 0, and consequently the mutant cannot invade; red
regions correspond to the case when λ(cres, cm) > 0, and the mutant can invade.
For this type of punishment/reward function, there is a region where invader can invade but unlike
the previous case, there exists an upper boundary for the possible values of successful cm. Unlike in the
previous case, singular strategy is stable, which predictably implies that punishment needs to be severe
enough in order to be able to prevent invasion by over consumers. Moreover, for large enough values of
a, there can exist two singular strategies, one evolutionarily stable and one evolutionarily unstable. In
this case, the more “altruistic” ESS, which corresponds to smaller values of c∗res, is unstable, probably
because in this case the reward for under-consumption is insufficiently large, and the punishment is not
sufficiently severe. The second ESS, which corresponds to larger values of c∗res is evolutionarily stable,
and so the mutant over-consumer cannot invade.
For this punishment function, the selection gradient is D(cm) = r − 3a(1 − cm)2, so D(cm) > 0 if
either cm > 1−
√
r
3a or cm < 1+
√
r
3a . One can see that there exists a region, where the mutant cannot
invade even when the enforcement of punishment, accounted for with parameter a, is quite small. This
can be interpreted as the rewards of over-consumption being too small below the red invasibility zone,
and the costs of punishment being too great above the red invasibility zone.
Figure 3: Selection gradient and pairwise invasibility plots for function of the type f(c) = a(1 − c)3.
Blue regions correspond to parameter values where the mutant cannot invade; red regions correspond
to parameter values where it can invade. (a) selection gradient, defined in Equation (6) (b) PIP for
a = 0.1; the singular strategy c∗res is evolutionarily and convergence stable (c) PIP for a = 0.6; there
seem to appear two singular strategies for large enough values of a; one of the strategies is evolutionarily
unstable, as neither the reward is large enough for the under-consumers, nor the punishment severe
enough for over-consumers; the second strategy is c∗res is evolutionarily and convergence stable. This
punishment/reward function is effective against aggressive over-consumers.
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Case 3. Separating punishment and reward
Finally, consider the following punishment/reward function: f(c) = ρ(1−cη). This functional form allows
to separate the impact of punishment for over-consumption, which is increased or decreased depending
on the value of parameter η, and reward for under-consumption, which is influenced primarily by the
value of parameter ρ. In this case, the dominant eigenvalue is given by λ = r(cm − cres)− ρ(cηm − cηres).
As one can clearly see, if for instance r = ρ, then λ > 0 when η < 1, and so the mutant should be able to
invade, since the punishment for over-consumption is always less than its reproductive benefits; if η > 1,
the inequality is reversed, and punishment overwhelms reproductive benefits. If η = 1, then everything
is determined solely by the relative values of growth rate r and the reward parameter ρ. If cm ≈ cres,
then the mutant can (or cannot) invade if D(cm) = r − ρηc(η−1)m is positive (negative).
As one can see on Figure 4 and 5, this type of function behaves like case 1 for η < 1 and like case 2
for η > 1. These results reiterate the claim that was made in the previous two cases: punishment needs
to be severe enough in order to successfully prevent invasion by over-consumers.
Figure 4: Pairwise invasibility plots for function type f(c) = ρ(1− cη), η = 0.9. The effectiveness of this
function is the same as was for case 1: punishment is not severe enough to keep over-consumers out of
the population.
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Figure 5: Pairwise invasibility plots for function type f(c) = ρ(1− cη), η = 1.2. The effectiveness of this
function is the same as was for case 2: punishment is sufficiently severe to keep over-consumers out of
the population.
Modeling parametrically heterogeneous populations using the Reduction the-
orem
Adaptive dynamics allows to obtain analytical results about system susceptibility to invasion in the case
when the invading “mutant” (in this case an over-consumer with a higher value of cm) is rare. However,
what if the initial mutant is not rare (invasion by a group)? What if there is more than one type of
mutant (the system did not have time to recalibrate before the new mutant came along)? We attempt
to address these questions through application of the Reduction theorem for replicator equations.
Without incorporating heterogeneity one cannot study the effects of natural selection on the system,
and until recently any attempts to write such models resulted in systems of immense dimensionality.
However, the proposed approach allows us to overcome this problem.
Assume that each individual in the population studied is characterized by its own value of some intrin-
sic parameter, such as birth, death, resource consumption rates, etc. (a set of individuals characterized by
a particular value of the parameter studied is referred to here as a clone). The distribution of clones will
change over time due to system dynamics, since different clones impose different selective pressures on
each other. Consequently, the mean of the parameter studied also changes over time. The mean can be
computed at each time point using the moment generating function of the initial distribution of clones in
the population. The changes in the mean of the parameter allows easy tracking of changes in population
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composition in response to changes in micro-environment (such as varying nutrient availability) or with
respect to different initial distributions of clones.
Now let us introduce an auxiliary variable q(t), which satisfies q(t)′ = N(t)kz(t) , so that one may rewrite
the system in the following form:
x′c(t)
xc(t)
= r(c− q(t)′) + f(c),
z′(t) = p− dz(t) + eN(t)(1− E
t[c])
N(t) + z(t)
.
Then
xc(t) = xc(0)e
−q(t)+t(rc+f(c)). (7)
Total population size is then given by
N(t) =
ˆ
c∈A
xc(t)dc = N(0)e
−q(t)
ˆ
c
et(rc+f(c))Pc(0)dc, (8)
where Pc(0) =
xc(0)
N(0) , and the current-time pdf is given by
Pc(t) =
xc(t)
N(t)
=
et(rc+f(c))Pc(0)´
et(rc+f(c))Pc(0)dc
. (9)
Now, the expected value of c can be calculated from the definition:
Et[c] =
ˆ
c
cPc(t) =
´
c
cet(rc+f(c))Pc(0)dc´
c
et(rc+f(c))Pc(0)dc
. (10)
The final system of equations becomes :
z′(t) = p− dz + eN(t)(1− E
t[c])
N(t) + z(t)
, (11)
q′(t) =
N(t)
kz(t)
, (12)
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where N(t) and Et[c] are defined above.
The case, when f(c) = 0 was investigated in [9]. The authors observed that although it takes longer
for a heterogeneous population to go extinct, tragedy of the commons eventually happens if the maximum
value of c is large enough. Moreover, one could observe transitional regimes as the population was evolving
towards being composed of increasingly efficient over-consumers. This situation can be used to forecast
upcoming crisis and start implementing punishment functions.
In the proposed form, if the system is parametrically homogeneous system, i.e. when Et[c] is constant,
f(c) can be factored into equation x
′
x = r(c + f(c) − bxkz ), and consequently, the spectrum of possible
dynamical behaviors for this modified system should be qualitatively the same compared to the initial
model, analyzed in [9] and summarized in Section 2. However, while in [9] nothing prevented increase
of Et[c] up to the maximum possible value, here we want to investigate punishment/reward functions
that will prevent the increase of Et[c] that would otherwise drive the dynamics outside of the regions of
sustainable coexistence with the common resource.
Results
We evaluated the effectiveness of several punishment/reward functions on the dynamics of growth of
a heterogeneous population of consumers supported by a common dynamical carrying capacity, which
can be increased or decreased by the individuals themselves. We evaluated the effects of the same
type of punishment on populations with two different types of initial distributions of clones, namely
truncated exponential with parameter µ = 10, and Beta distribution with parameters α = 2 , β = 2 and
α = 2, β = 5 (see Figure 6). Parameter values were chosen in such a way as to give different shapes of the
initial distribution of clones within the population We hypothesized that the effectiveness of punishment
will depend not only intrinsic parameter values of the system but also on the initial composition of the
population. Specifically, we hypothesized that higher levels of punishment/reward will be necessary for
initial distributions, where population composition is spread out further away from small values of c, such
as Beta distributions with parameters α = 2, β = 5 and even more so Beta distribution with parameters
α = 2, β = 2 (see Figure 6b) compared to truncated exponential distribution, where fewer over consumers
are initially present in the population (see Figure 6a).
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Figure 6: Initial distributions (a) truncated exponential with parameter µ = 10 (b) Beta distribution
with parameters α = 2, β = 2 and α = 2, β = 5 .
First, we evaluated the effectiveness of the moderate punishment function of type f(c) = a 1−c1+c ; the
severity of punishment is captured through varying parameter a. The initial distribution was taken to
be truncated exponential with parameter µ = 10. We took parameter a = 0; 0.5; 1; 2 and plotted the
changes in xc(t) for various c over time (Figure 7), as well as the changes in the total population size
and the amount of resource (Figure 8). We observed that when the punishment imposed is moderate,
over-consumption could be avoided only when the value of a was very high, i.e. when punishment is
imposed very severely.
15
Figure 7: (a) Truncated exponential, moderate punishment (case 1), set 1, a = 0. (b) Truncated
exponential, case 1, set 1, a = 0.5. (c) Truncated exponential, case 1, set 1, a = 1. (d) Truncated
exponential, case 1, set 1, a = 2.
Figure 8: Truncated exponential distribution, set 1, case 1, dynamics of the total population size and total
resource with respect to different values of a (different levels of severity of imposed punishment). One can
see that successful management of over consumers was possible only when punishment implementation
was very high.
Similar results were observed for the cases of Beta distribution with parameters α = 2, β = 2 and
α = 2, β = 5 (additional figures are provided in Appendix). The value of a that was necessary for
successful management of over-consumers varied depending on different initial distributions, indicating
that in order to be able to prevent the tragedy of the commons, one needs to evaluate not only the
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type of punishment and the severity of its enforcement but also match it to the composition of the
population, since one level of punishment can be effective for one distribution of clones within a population
of consumers and not another. Noticeably, this kind of insight would be impossible to obtain using the
analytical methods of adaptive dynamics.
Next, we conducted the same set of numerical experiments for the severe punishment\generous reward
function f(c) = a(1− c)3. We observed that the value of a that would correspond to successful restraint
of over-consumers was much lower than in the previous case for all initial distributions considered here
(see Figures 10, 9; additional examples are provided in Appendix). The system was able to support
individuals with higher values of parameter c present in the initial population than in the previous case.
In some cases we were also able to observe brief periods of oscillatory transitional dynamical behavior
before the system collapsed (see Figures 9 and 10).
Figure 9: Severe punishment/generous reward (case 2). Beta distribution with parameters [α, β] = [2, 2].
(a) a = 0, (b) a = 0.1, (c) a = 0.17, (d) a = 0.2. One can see the population going through transitional
regimes before collapse, when the punishment is implemented severely but not quite severely enough
(when a = 0.7). This most probably corresponds to the expected value of parameter c going through
region 3 in the phase parameter portrait of the non-distributed system.
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Figure 10: Case 2, set 1. Beta distribution with parameters [2, 2]. Changes in total population size and
of the common resource over time.
Finally, we evaluated punishment function of the type f(c) = ρ(1 − cη), where the intensity of pun-
ishment and reward are accounted for by parameters η and ρ respectively. We observed that in order to
evaluate the expected effectiveness of the punishment/reward system one needs to not only adjust param-
eters ρ and η (see Figure 11) to each particular case considered but also be able to evaluate the expected
range of parameter c (see Figure 12), since one level of punishment may be appropriate for one set of
initial conditions but not another. For instance, as one can see on Figure 12, the time to collapse under
fixed values of parameter ρ and η is different for different initial distributions depending on the maximum
value of c present in the initial population. Moreover, in accordance with our hypothesis, indeed the
time to collapse varies depending on the initial distribution of the clones within the population, and the
higher the frequency of over-consumers is in the initial population, the worse the prognosis. For the
examples considered, population in which the clones are distributed according to truncated exponential
distribution is less likely to collapse due to over-consumption than Beta distribution with parameters
α = 2, β = 5 which in turn is slightly less prone to collapse than Beta distribution with parameters
α = 2, β = 2 (Figure 6).
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Figure 11: f(c) = ρ(1− cη), initial Beta distribution with parameters α = 2, β = 2, c ∈ [0, 3], η = 1.2.
Figure 12: The importance of evaluating the range of possible values of cf , illustrated for different initial
distribution. Punishment function is of the type f(c) = ρ(1 − cη), where ρ = 0.6, η = 1.2. Initial
distributions are taken to be truncated exponential with parameter µ = 10, and Beta with parameters
α = 2, β = 2 and α = 2, β = 5; ρ = 0.6, η = 1.2. The top row corresponds to c ∈ [0, 3]; the bottom row
corresponds to c ∈ [0, 4].
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On the existence and properties of stationary distributions
The adaptive dynamics approach assumes that there exists a stable state of a population composed from
a single clone xres. In the absence of punishment, any initial distribution evolves in such a way, that
asymptotically only the clone having maximal possible value of the parameter c will persist. In contrast,
introducing a punishment function allows for the possibility of a stationary distribution of clones that is
concentrated in more than one point. Specifically, we show below that a population in a stationary state
may consist of up to 2 clones with punishment function of the 1st and 3rd type and of up to 3 clones
with punishment function of the 2nd type.
Assume that there exists a stationary distribution Pc(t) =
xc(t)
N(t) of clones xc that stabilizes over time,
which would occur when
dPc(t)
dt
=
x′c
N
− xc
N2
N ′ = Pc(t)[rc+ f(c)− Et[rc]− Et[f(c)]] = 0, (13)
which holds only when
rc+ f(c) = Et[rc] + Et[f(c)]. (14)
The left hand side of Equation (14) does not depend on time, while the right hand side is independent
of c, which implies that Equation (14) holds only when
rc+ f(c) = K, (15)
where K is a constant.
Recall that {ci} is the support of a probability distribution P if P (c) > 0 for all ci and P (c) = 0
otherwise. In our case, if there exists a constant K such that
f(ci) = K − rci, (16)
then to eachK corresponds a stationary distribution P (ci), whose support {ci} coincides with the solution
to this equation. Therefore, Equation (16) can be used to identify the values of c that correspond to
distributed evolutionary steady states. (Note that a) any distribution concentrated in a single point c
is clearly stationary, and b) if f(c) ≡ ac, where a is a constant, then every stationary distribution is
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concentrated in a single point.)
It follows from Equation (16) that for a given punishment function f(c), the set of solutions to Equation
(16) at fixed K can be represented geometrically as a set S(K) of abscissas of points of intersection of
the curve y = f(c) and the line y = K − rc. The constant K is free, so by changing K in such a way that
the set S(K) is not empty, we obtain all possible supports of the stationary distributions (see Figure 13).
Figure 13: Steady states are concentrated at the points of intersection of punishment function y = f(c)
and a line y = K − rc. Depending on the type of punishment function and on the angle of the line
y = K − rc, one may have up to three clone types at the stationary state.
An important conclusion can be made from these figures alone. As one can see in Figure 13a, for
instance, the two points of intersection of f(c) and y = K− rc that correspond to points of concentration
of clones at a stationary state, can be less than or greater than 1, depending on the parameter r, which
is the slope of the line y = K − rc. The case when one of the points of intersection is less than one
(“altruistic” under-consuming clones) and one is greater than one (over-consumers) can be interpreted
as a population of under-consumers “supporting” the population of over-consumers at a stationary state.
Asymptotic behavior of the population, i.e., population survival or extinction, will be determined by the
dynamics of System (17), which is derived below, and corresponding parameter values.
Once again, let {ci} be a support of stationary probability distribution. Then dxcidt /xci = r(K − Nkz ).
The right hand side does not depend on i, which implies that
ln(xci(t))− ln(xcj (t)) = const, for all i, j
and xci (t)xcj (t) =
xci (0)
xcj (0)
for all t. (Note that i, j notation is used in this section to distinguish the fact that
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we are no longer dealing with rare clones in a resident population, and hence previously used m, res
notation is no longer appropriate.)
The dynamics of System (4) in this case can be described by
dN
dt
= rN(K − N
kz
) (17)
dz
dt
= γ − δz + eN
z +N
(1− E),
where E = Et[c] = const and consequently does not depend on t.
Now let Ai =
xci (0)∑
j xcj (0)
be the initial frequency of clones xci ; then E =
∑
iAici. Therefore, by changing
the initial values of x(ci) we can vary the value of E frommin(ci) up tomax(ci). Stable equilibria (N∗, z∗)
of System (17) can now be found from N∗ = kKz∗ and γ− δz∗+ eN∗z∗+N∗ (1−E) = γ− δz∗+B = 0, where
B = (1−E)ekK1+ekK = const. Therefore, z
∗ = γ+Bδ , given that γ +B > 0.
System (17) is very similar to the initial parametrically homogeneous model with no punishment; the
difference is that now the values ofK and E are not identical: the valueK is in one-to-one correspondence
with the support {ci}, and the value of E is defined by the support {ci} and initial values {xci(0)}. These
results suggest that if the system has a stationary distribution, then the dynamics of the resource would
be determined not by absolute sizes of the populations of ‘invaders’ and ‘residents’, but by their ratio.
Remark. In this work we are considering punishment functions, where the support of the stationary
distribution can consist of up to three points, i.e., the system can be composed of up to three clones (see
Figure 13b). However, one can conceive of a punishment function that can support an arbitrary number
of clones in the population at the stationary distribution, which correspond to points of intersection of
the curve y = f(c) and the line y = K−rc. Such system is of course unlikely to survive for any significant
period of time unless the number of individuals in the clones with c∗  1 is small enough. Such a case can
be interpreted as a large number of under-consumers supporting a very small number of over-consumers.
Example 1.
Consider the punishment function of the form f(c) = a(1−c)1+c ; the points of tangency of the curve y =
a(1−c)
1+c
and the line y = K − rc are c∗1,2 = ±
√
2a/r − 1. In order for c∗ = √2a/r − 1 > 0, condition 2a > r
must be satisfied. At c∗, f(c∗) =
√
2ar − a, so the line y = K − rc is tangent with y = f(c) = a(1−c)1+c at
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K = K∗ =
√
2ar −A+ r(√2a/r − 1) (see dotted line in Figure 13a).
Hence, the line y = K−rc intersects the curve y = f(c) in two points (see dashed red line in Figure13a)
for all K∗ < K < a.
For the purposes of illustration, take a = 1, r = 0.4, K = 0.7 (see Figure 13a). The stationary
distribution is concentrated in two points c1 = 0.25 and c2 = 3, so in its steady state, the population is
composed both of under-consumers and of over-consumers. The population dynamics is then described
by system
dN
dt
= 0.4N(0.7− N
kz
),
dz
dt
= γ − δz + eN
z +N
(1− E),
where E ∈ [c1 = 0.25, c2 = 3]. For these particular values of parameters, the system will remain in the
stable state if δz∗ = γ+ eN
∗
z∗+N∗ (1− E) = γ + 0.412e(1− E) > 0. Otherwise, it will go to extinction.
Example 2.
Now consider the punishment function of the form f(c) = a(1 − c)3. The line y = K − rc is tangent to
the curve y = f(c) at c∗1,2 = 1±
√
r/(3a).
Denote
√
r/(3a) = ψ. Then c∗i,2 = 1± ψ; the condition ψ < 1 needs to be satisfied in order for both
roots to be positive.
Consequently,
f(c∗1,2) = ∓ψ,
K∗1,2 = f(c
∗
2,1) + rc
∗
1,2 = r(1± ψ)∓ ψ3;
and therefore
Kmin = r(1 + ψ)− ψ3 < K < r(1− ψ) + ψ3 = Kmax.
There can exist up to 3 points of intersection of the curve f(c) = a(1 − c)3 and the line y = K − rc
depending on the value of K.
As one can see in Figure 13b, where a = r = 1, ψ =
√
1/3, c∗1,2 = 1±
√
1/3, if K > Kmax = 1.3849,
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then there are no solutions to Equation (16); if 1 < K < Kmax, then there exist 2 solutions to Equation
(16); if 0.6151 = Kmin < K < 1, then there can exist 3 solutions. For instance, taking K = 0.8 and
solving equation f(c) = K − rc, i.e., (1 − c)3 = 0.8 − c, we obtain the following solutions: c1 = 0.121,
c2 = 0.791, c3 = 2.08. So, in this case, at the steady state, two ‘altruistic’ clones with c1 = 0.121 and
c2 = 0.791 are supporting over-consuming clones with c3 = 2.088.
The overall system dynamics for this example are given by
dN
dt
= rN(0.8− N
kz
),
dz
dt
= γ − δz + eN
z +N
(1− E),
where E ∈ [c1 = 0.121, c3 = 2.088]. If k = 1, then at the stationary state N∗ = 0.8z∗ and N∗z∗+N∗ = 0.81.8 =
0.444. The system will remain at a steady state if
δz∗ = γ +
eN∗
z∗ +N∗
(1− E) = γ + 0.444e(1− E) > 0;
Otherwise, it will go to extinction.
Discussion
In this paper we studied the dynamics of a consumer-resource type system in order to answer the question
of whether infliction of punishment for over-consumption and reward for under-consumption can success-
fully prevent, or at least delay, the onset of the tragedy of the commons. We evaluated the effectiveness
of three types of punishment functions, as well as the effects of punishment on populations with different
initial composition of individuals with respect to the levels of resource (over)consumption.
The proposed model was studied analytically in [9, 10] without incorporating punishment/reward
for over-/under- consumption. It describes the interactions of a population of consumers, characterized
by the value of an intrinsic parameter c, with a common renewable resource in such a way that each
individual can either contribute to increasing the common dynamical carrying capacity (c < 1) or take
more than they restore (c > 1). As the value of c increases, the population goes through a series of
transitional regimes from sustainable coexistence with the resource to oscillatory regime to eventually
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committing evolutionary suicide through decreasing the common carrying capacity to a level that can no
longer support the population.
We began by identifying analytical conditions leading to the possibility of sustainable coexistence
with the common resource for a subset of cases using adaptive dynamics. This method allows to address
the question of whether a mutant (in our case, an individual with a higher value of c) can invade a
homogeneous resident population of resource consumers. We evaluated the effectiveness of three types
of punishment functions: moderate punishment, f(c) = a 1−c1+c ; severe punishment, f(c) = a(1 − c)3,
where the parameter a denotes the severity of implementation of punishment on individuals with the
corresponding value of parameter c, and function of the type f(c) = ρ(1− cη), which allows to separate
the influence of reward for under-consumption, primarily accounted for with parameter ρ, and punishment
for over-consumption, accounted for with parameter η.
We demonstrated that while moderate punishment/reward function can be effective in keeping off
moderate over-consumers at sufficiently high values of a (see Figures 7 and 8), the evolutionarily singular
strategy in this case is unstable, and thus eventually the population will be invaded by over-consumers
with large enough value of c. The severe punishment/generous reward approach was uniformly effective,
almost irrespective of the value of a, and allowed invasion of moderate over consumers only in the small
region of c ≈ 1, when the punishment is not yet severe enough to outweigh the benefits of moderate over-
consumption (see Figures 9 and 10), and the reward does not yet provide sufficient payoffs in terms of
higher growth rates. The evolutionarily singular strategy in this case is stable, suggesting that punishment
is severe enough to prevent the tragedy of the commons.
Finally, we investigated a punishment/reward function of the type f(c) = ρ(1− cη) that allowed sep-
arating the influence of punishment for over-consumption (parameter η) from that of rewarding under-
consumption (parameter ρ). This functional type behaves as a moderate punishment/reward function
for η < 1, rendering it effective only for moderate over-consumers, and it behaves like the severe pun-
ishment/reward function for η > 1; in the critical case η = 1 the outcome of the interactions between
resident and invader populations is determined solely by relative values of growth rate parameter r and
parameter ρ. Our results suggest that just rewarding under-consumers is not enough to prevent invasion
by over consumers and hence one should not expect to be able to prevent the tragedy of the commons
through reward alone.
Adaptive dynamics techniques do not yet allow answering the question of system invasibility when
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the mutant is not rare, such as in cases of migration and consequent invasion by a group, or when
the resident population is inhomogeneous. We address these questions using the Reduction theorem for
replicator equations.
Assume that each individual consumer is characterized by his or her own value of the intrinsic param-
eter c; a group of consumers with this value of c is referred to here as c-clones. This trait directly affects
fitness, and thus the distribution of clones will change over time due to system dynamics. The clones
will experience selective pressures not only from the external environment, competing for the limited
resource, but also from each other. Consequently, the mean of the parameter will also change over time,
affecting system dynamics. The mean of the parameter can be computed at each time point from the
moment generating function of the initial distribution of clones, which allows to evaluate the effective-
ness of different types of punishment/reward functions on population composition by tracking how the
distribution of clones changed over time with respect to parameter c.
We evaluated the effectiveness of the same three types of punishment/reward functions on system
evolution and calculated predicted the outcomes for different initial distributions of clones within the
population, which were taken to be truncated exponential with parameter µ = 10, and Beta distribution
with parameters α = 2, β = 2 and α = 2, β = 5. The initial distributions were chosen in such a way
as to give significantly different shapes of the initial probability density function; in applications they
should be matched to real data, when it is available. We observed that the intensity of implementation
of punishment\reward has to differ for different initial distributions if one is to successfully stop over-
consumption, and so in order to be able to make any reasonable predictions one needs to understand
what the initial composition of the affected population is. We hypothesized that the higher the frequency
of over consumers in the initial population, the more severe the punishment for over-consumption would
have to be, and the more generous the reward; specifically, for our examples, we anticipated the prognosis
to be the most favorable for initial truncated exponential distribution, followed by Beta distribution with
parameters α = 2, β = 5 and then finally α = 2, β = 2. This effect additionally implies that the results
obtained analytically from adaptive dynamics can only be relevant for a subset of cases, i.e. when the
invader is rare.
As anticipated, we observed that severe punishment/generous reward approach was much more effec-
tive in preventing the tragedy of the commons than the moderate punishment/reward function, partic-
ularly for the cases, when over-consumers were present at higher frequencies (such as both Beta initial
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distributions). Specifically, we observed that the level of implementation, a, could be nearly ten times
lower for severe punishment/generous reward system as compared to the moderate punishment function
(a ≈ 0.2 vs a ≈ 2) in order to obtain the same effect of selecting against the over-consumers, which
can be a very important factor in cases when there are large costs associated with implementation of
such intervention systems. This comes not only from the severity of punishment but also from the fact
that moderate punishment allows more time for the over-consumers to replicate, and thus by the time
the punishment has an appreciable effect, the population composition had changed, and the moderate
punishment will no longer be effective. So, in punishment implementation one needs to take into account
not only the severity of punishment but also the time window that moderate punishment may provide,
allowing over-consumers to proliferate. Within the frameworks of the proposed model, moderate im-
plementation of more severe punishment\reward system is more effective than severe implementation of
moderate punishment\reward.
Proposed here is just one way to try and modify individuals’ payoffs in order to prevent resource over-
consumption - through inflicting punishment and reward that affects the growth rates of clones directly.
This approach can be modified depending on different situations, inflicting punishment or reward based
not just on the intrinsic value of c but on total resource currently available.
Adaptive dynamics and the Reduction theorem. In order to address our questions we have used
two recently developed methods for modeling parametrically heterogeneous populations: adaptive dynam-
ics [1] and the Reduction theorem for replicator equations [7, 8]. Adaptive dynamics allows addressing
the question of rare “mutant” clone invasion using standard bifurcation theory. The method allows to
formulate analytical conditions, which can be conveniently visualized using pairwise invasibility plots
(PIPs). However, the method does not allow addressing questions of system invasibility by clones that
are not rare, such as in cases of invasion by a group, or when the resident population is heterogeneous.
These questions can be addressed using the Reduction theorem for replicator equations.
We consider the moment of “invasion” as the initial time moment; more formally, we assume that all
“invaders” must be present initially in the population, falling within some known distribution; one can
then see which clone type(s) will be favored over time due to natural selection and visualize evolutionary
trajectories, which cannot be achieved using adaptive dynamics. The outcome depends both on the initial
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distribution of the clones within the population and on the initial state of the system, i.e., other intrinsic
properties of both individuals within the population and the resources, which in this case were assumed
to be fixed. However, the system of ODEs that results from the transformation done using the Reduction
theorem is typically non-autonomous; hence no analytical conditions can typically be obtained using
standard bifurcation theory. The two methods therefore can complement each other. A more detailed
comparison of the two methods is in Table 3.
Tragedy of the commons as prisoner’s dilemma
The conditions that can lead to the tragedy of the commons can be reformulated as a game of prisoner’s
dilemma: in such systems preserving the common resource is in the best interest of the group as a whole
but over-consumption is in the interest of each particular individual. In the cases where decisions about
the resource are made by each individual independently, tragedy of the commons seems to be inevitable.
However, a number of cases have been observed, when the tragedy could be avoided if the individuals
within the population were able to communicate with each other [14]. The common thread that runs
through many of the available examples is that 1) in small groups the effects of over-consumption are
immediately noticeable, since within a small population each individual’s actions are more visible than
in larger populations, and 2) punishment is enforced without delay.
In this paper we are dealing with a particular case of a game of prisoner’s dilemma, where punish-
ment/reward functions f(c) affect individual payoffs in such a way as to give the possibility to outweigh
both the benefits of over-consumption and the deleterious effects of under-consumption (see Figure 14).
We were able to demonstrate that preventing the tragedy of the commons through solely rewarding
under-consumers is unlikely. However, the effectiveness of “intervention” is increased when both reward
and punishment systems are enforced, although they do need to be modified depending on population
composition, since the choices of individuals may be affected not only by their immediate ‘payoffs’ but
also by the actions of those surrounding them. Therefore, if one is to try and avert the tragedy of the
commons through punishing over-consumption and rewarding under-consumption, one needs to not only
find an appropriate punishment/reward function but also calibrate it to the current composition of each
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Figure 14: Tragedy of the commons as prisoner’s dilemma. The tragedy can be avoided if the immediate
payoffs of all the players are modified through appropriate punishment/reward functions.
particular population.
Acknowledgments
The authors wougameld like to thank Kalle Parvinen and John Nagy for their help with adaptive dy-
namics. This project has been supported by grants from the National Science Foundation (NSF - Grant
DMPS-0838705), the National Security Agency (NSA - Grant H98230-09-1-0104), the Alfred P. Sloan
Foundation, the Office of the Provost of Arizona State University and Intramural Research Program
of the NIH, NCBI. This material is also based upon work partially supported by the National Science
Foundation under Grant No. DMS-1135663.
29
References
[1] S.A.H. Geritz, E. Kisdi, G. Mesze, and J.A.J. Metz. Evolutionarily singular strategies and the adaptive
growth and branching of the evolutionary tree, Evolutionary ecology, 12(1): 35-57, 1997.
[2] AN Gorban, Equilibrium encircling. Equations of chemical kinetics and their thermodynamic analysis,
Nauka, Novosibirsk, 1984.
[3] AN Gorban, Selection theorem for systems with inheritance, Math. Model. Nat. Phenom, 2(4):1-45,
2007.
[4] G. Hardin. The tragedy of the commons. Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, 1(3):243-253,
2009.
[5] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund. Evolutionary game dynamics. Bulletin of the American Mathematical
Society, 40(4):479, 2003.
[6] D. J Rankin and A. Lopez-Sepulcre. Can adaptation lead to extinction? Oikos, 111(3):616-619, 2005.
[7] G.P. Karev. On mathematical theory of selection: continuous time population dynamics. Journal of
mathematical biology, 60(1):107-129, 2010.
[8] G.P. Karev. Principle of minimum discrimination information and replica dynamics.Entropy,
12(7):1673-1695, 2010.
[9] I. Kareva, F. Berezovskaya, and C. Castillo-Chavez. Transitional regimes as early warning signals in
resource dependent competition models. Mathematical Biosciences, 240(2): 114-123, 2012.
[10] D.C. Krakauer, K.M. Page, and D.H. Erwin. Diversity, dilemmas, and monopolies of niche construc-
tion. The American Naturalist, 173(1):26-40, 2009.
[11] M. Milinski, D. Semmann, and H.J. Krambeck. Reputation helps solve the tragedy of the commons.
Nature, 415(6870):424-426, 2002.
[12] J.H. Miller and S.E. Page. Complex adaptive systems: An introduction to computational models of
social life. Princeton University Press, 2007.
[13] M.A. Nowak. Evolutionary dynamics: exploring the equations of life. Belknap Press, 2006.
30
[14] E. Ostrom. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge
University Press, 1990.
[15] S.E. Page. The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and
Societies (New Edition). Princeton University Press, 2008.
[16] S.E. Page. Diversity and complexity. Princeton University Press, 2011.
[17] T.L. Vincent and J.S. Brown. Evolutionary game theory, natural selection, and Darwinian dynamics.
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[18] B. Vollan and E. Ostrom. Cooperation and the commons. Science, 330(6006):923-924, 2010.
31
